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Detachmentfromexternalreality,distancingfromothers,closureintoasortofvirtualhermitage,andprevalenceofinnerfantasies,
are the descriptive aspects of autism. However, from an anthropological-phenomenological point of view, in schizophrenia, the
autistic mode of life can arise from a person’s being confronted with a pathological crisis in the obviousness of the intersubjective
world, essentially a crisis in the intersubjective foundation of human presence. The “condition of possibility” of the autistic way of
being is the deﬁciency of the operation that phenomenology call empathetic-intuitive constitution of the Other, an Other which
is the naturalness of evidence of being a subject like me. The theme of the Other, of intersubjectivity, has become so central in
the psychopathological analysis of schizophrenic disorders because the modiﬁcations of interhuman encounter cannot be seen as
the secondary consequences of symptoms but constitute the fundamental disorder of schizophrenic alienation. Revision of the
concept of autism from the original deﬁnition, centered on the prevalence of inner fantasies, leads to the profound change with
the vision of autism as “loss” and “void.” I call attention to possibility of phenomenological research to understand autistic world
starting from this “void.”
The image of retreat, of separation from the world that is
common(theeverydayworld)andin-common(sharedbyall),
has from the beginning been central to the concept of autism
and has remained one of its most evident descriptive aspects.
However, rethinking the phenomenon of autism means
asking ourselves what angles of study are adopted to view it,
and how it disappears when viewed from other angles. The
horizon on which the concept of autism arises most richly
and meaningfully is undoubtedly that of phenomenological
psychiatry. From a phenomenological point of view, in
schizophrenia, the condition that can be called the autistic
modeoflifecanarisefromaperson’sbeingconfrontedwitha
pathological crisis in the obviousness of the intersubjectivity
of the world, that is, a diﬃculty in the foundation of the
Other in the mind of the subject.
The interdependence between constitution of the Self
and constitution of the Other explains the pathological
experiences that express at the same time the crisis in the
relationship with oneself, with a Self that has become a
stranger, and with the Self of others, which has lost the
naturalnessofbeing anothersubjectlikeme,withhisnormal
distance from me, and it is often perceived by the autistic
person as an “enigma.” Really, the autistic person would like
to have a personal “Theory of Mind” to understand others,
“possibly in a ﬁle,” as a patient told me.
Daily life, which is normally a problematic in its silent
foundation of the constitution of the Other, appears cracked
in schizophrenic autism, and autism can be its perceivable
expression, like an atmosphere enveloping this manner of
being, even before a possible delusion arises. Autism is thus
at its base a sort of “void,” which can nonetheless be grasped,
and which has been explored, after Eugen Bleuler, in the
schizoid personality and schizophrenia as a “loss of vital
contact with reality” by E. Minkowski, as “inconsistency
of natural experience” by L. Binswanger, and as “loss of
natural evidence or overall crisis of “common sense” by W.
Blankenburg—in my opinion all are broadly overlapping
theses.
All this research touches on the source, the root, the
condition of possibility for the manner of life we call
autism to manifest, a manner which often creates anthro-
pological ﬁgures revolving around “strangeness,” “oddity,”
Verschrobenheit, as Binswanger calls it.
Autism is a concept that goes beyond psychiatric diag-
noses, even if it ﬁnds in the sphere of schizophrenia its most
complete and pervasive expression and characterization. It2 The Scientiﬁc World Journal
canthusbeproposedthatevenifnotallformsofautisticstyle
are in themselves diagnosable as schizophrenic disorders,
the core forms of the schizophrenias are unthinkable except
as autistic. Indeed, for Minkowski, autism is not one of
the symptoms of schizophrenia: it is schizophrenia itself,
as a peculiar mode of existence. At the intersection of the
cultural backgrounds deriving from Bergson’s philosophy
and from phenomenology, at the intersection of the concepts
of “generative disorder” and of involvement of the entire
personality, the turning point is Minkowski’s conception
of “autistic activity.” It is through this, the autistic person
can no longer be considered as simply turned in on his
fantasies, and autism is a phenomenon understood purely
as interiorization, as “passive r´  everie, absorption of the
personality merely by its inner life” (E. Minkowski). The
observation is that suﬀerers from schizophrenic autism are
not all passively turned in on themselves, but even when they
do act in the world, their activity has a profoundly morbid
stamp to it, because they throw their act out into the world
without taking account of it, in the sense of it not being
suﬃciently in agreement with “common sense,” so that the
act seems “strange,” “inconsistent,” “stiﬀ,” “overdone,” and
burns out in itself (actes sans lendemain).
Minkowski wrote in Au-del` a du rationalisme morbide
[1] that “We feel, from time to time, the need to isolate
ourselves from the environment and remain alone with
ourselves ... But ... do we therefore try just the same to
exclude thoroughly every outside inﬂuence? No, of course
not. On the contrary, we let the environment act on us. In
this way, while isolating ourselves, we remain in contact with
the environment.” The author notes that in this relationship,
always ﬂuid and changing, between isolating ourselves to
safeguard our own originality and receptiveness to the
environment, they are not precepts of mental health, except
maybe in the elastic ﬂuidity of this relationship, whose
“regulating element” is totally unrationalizable; Minkowski
calls it sentiment d’harmonie avec la vie.
If, paraphrasing Pascal, “life has its reasons that reason
has no way of explaining,” it from this prerational, preverbal
harmony with the world of life is the sense of limits and
measure derives: at bottom, the obvious evidence of the
world as intersubjective.
On another level, we can say that the “co” that grounds
being as cobeing appears in the autistic way of acting
to be even more openly lacked than in inertia-isolation-
withdrawal, which we can always imagine as the fruit of the
disturbed person’s immersion in a fantasy world, attributing
to him a richness and exuberance that may be exaggerated,
just as a New York lawyer did with his “scrivener” Bartleby,
in Melville’s story.
How ever, the clinical descriptions that have been made
of the autistic condition in its diﬀerent behavioral, relational,
andaﬀectiveaspectsconcernalsothecapacityofthe“person”
to react and to take a position, so to speak, with regard to
more basic generative disorders. For example, the autistic
breaking of relationship does not depend on a lack of
nearness in the spatiality of the interpersonal world, but it is
a reaction to a lack of distance, a defense against the risk of
being absorbed by the world.
When dealing with autism, we must not hide the
problems and diﬃculties involved, especially in the passage
from the plane of phenomenological vision to the plane of
clinical psychiatry. Autism, even before being a problem for
clinical psychiatry, is a problem for the tradition of general
psychopathology.
Indeed, above and beyond the analysis of individual
pathological experiences, the concept of autism compels an
anthropologicalattempttomovetowardanapproachtoman
as a whole.
Binswanger [2] writes that autism, from the anthropo-
logical perspective, means “subjugation of the Self by the
World, worldiﬁcation (Verweltlichung) or dismissal of the
Self, de-ipseiﬁcation”.
I emphasize the centrality in the anthropo-analytic
discussion of autism, and in general of schizophrenia, of the
concept of “subjugation by the world,” which represents the
opposite of the free projection of oneself into the world,
b u ti sap r o c e s si nw h i c h“ ...the accent of existence—as a
priori being-in-the-world—is displaced from oneself to the
world ...”[ 3].
It is this crisis of the habitual rootedness in the intersub-
jectivity of human presence that transforms normal “being-
with” into the unhappy defective autistic mode of being-
with, a mode that does not infrequently go so far as to
establish, in a sort of compensation for the basic deﬁcient
constitution of the Other, a human presence, even if in
oppression and, at worst, in persecution.
However, autism is not, I repeat, in terms of an analysis
of presence, just an unfortunate and deﬁcient speciﬁcation
of being-with, but it contains also a defensive aspect, an
attempt at resistance, even in the crisis of the ontological
foundation of ipse-ness, to aﬃrm oneself in any case in the
empirical world. It is signiﬁcant, as he has always reminded
us, that psychopathology considers, concerning the theme
of the restricted and oppressive spatiality of autism, that
this lack of contact expresses the person’s eﬀorts to break
free of the yoke of oppression placed on him by people and
situations. Autism shows in its various empirical forms a
defensive desire to be left in peace, which indicates just this
loss of protective distance from the world.
Here, in my opinion, it is necessary to recall once again
the distinction between the “condition of possibility” of the
autistic way of being (the deﬁciency of the operation that
phenomenology—from Husserl to Stein—call empathetic-
intuitiveconstitutionoftheOther)andthewaysinwhichthe
person manages, adapts, conforms, and even uses this same
deﬁciency in his life.
In a text written in 1917, Husserl’s glorious pupil Edith
Stein identiﬁes “empathy” as a basic problem “in that it is the
experience of subjects other than ourselves and of their life
experience(Erleben)...thephenomenonofapsychophysical
individual who is clearly diﬀerent from a physical “thing””
and presents itself “as a living sensible body that possesses
an I, an I that perceives, feels, wants ....” It is in contact
withothernessthatself-ness“succeedsindiﬀerentiatingitself
from the otherness of the other,” Stein adds.The Scientiﬁc World Journal 3
In an intersection of cross-references, empathetic move-
ment thus means the constitution of the other as a person
and the coconstitution of one’s own Self.
The phenomenon of autism has been the guiding thread
of the thought of numerous well-known scholars, but
studying autism is an experience of exciting insights and
resignation to disappointment, a concept that seduces the
mind ofthe psychopathologist alongthe pathtounderstand-
ing the core of schizophrenia and repeatedly disappoints the
clinician’s aspiration to exactness and reliability.
This is where we pay the price of the generic nature of the
formula “loss of contact with reality,” which while grasping
a reality that is evident in psychoses, becomes simply a
synonym for “psychosis.” So that, while not every autism
is delusional, neither is every delusion autistic, in the sense
described above.
Moreover, from an excursus on the forms that the
concept of autism has taken in the history of ideas in
psychiatry, one might draw the impression that more than
autism,thereexistvariousautisms,giventhat—asGlatzel[4]
asserts—autistic traits are inherent in every psychopatholog-
ical disturbance. This is certainly true, at least as regarding
psychotic disorders, when one makes the altered relationship
with reality, the all-encompassing viewpoint on autism,
without examining the manners and pathways that structure
this altered relationship with reality, and above all the “core”
of autism as a diﬃculty in the empathetic constitution of
the Other. So, as Tatossian emphasizes, we must not mistake
an “I” that has simply withdrawn from the world, as in
melancholy, for an autistic “I,” as in schizophrenia.
In recent years, the term autism has virtually disappeared
from psychiatric diagnostic manuals about schizophrenia.
Nonetheless, even if the word autism practically never
occurs in today’s psychiatric categorizations, its traces can
be discerned—albeit degraded to behavioral shells, which
tell us nothing about the subjectivity of the person—in the
formulation of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia.
Theopinionhasbeenwidespread,andtodayisreturning,
it seems to me, that considers autism to be a central element
of schizophrenia. However, the autism we are thinking about
today is more Minkowski’s with his vision of autism as “loss”
and “void” (“autisme pauvre”) than the autism of E. Bleuler’s
original deﬁnition, broadly centered on the prevalence of
inner fantasies.
In eﬀect, the history of the attempts to deﬁne the
syndrome or syndromes of the group of schizophrenias
seemstomelargelyahistoryoffailures.Nomatterhowmany
symptomological criteria we manage to bring together, it is
the “way of being” peculiar to schizophrenia that typically
colors the various symptoms.
No psychotic symptom is speciﬁc to schizophrenia (but,
atmost,someofthemmightbesuspect)ifitisnotimmersed
in the autistic atmosphere.
When autism and its conditions of possibility come forth
as a probable precursor of schizophrenia, we refer to situa-
tions of “imbalance” in which, for reasons connected both
with intrapersonal and situational dynamics (at bottom, the
separation between the I and the world is an apr` es coup of
reason), the style and way of living interwoven with autistic
elements lose their internal norm; they do not hold any
more, and the person is thrown oﬀ-balance by anguish. This
is certainly not the fated outcome of the autistic proﬁle
which, as a characteristic, embraces all the “schizophrenic
spectrum,” from personality disorders to psychosis.
Autism thus appears, on the pervasive level of absolu-
tization of a single way of being, as the pathoplastic core
of schizophrenia, which then takes expressive form in symp-
toms, of which retreat may be just one mode of behavior,
and withdrawal into oneself may be a forced necessity and at
the same time a means of defense. In other words, perhaps,
the course of schizophrenia may be initiated when psychotic
states of consciousness meet up with a person marked by
this problem in the constitution of the Other, when the
“pathology of the consciousness” (in H. Ey’s sense) takes
form through a particular autistic fragility of the person.
The theme of the Other, of intersubjectivity, has
become so central in the psychopathological analysis of
schizophrenic disorders because the modiﬁcations of inter-
human encounter cannot be seen as the secondary con-
sequences of symptoms but constitute the fundamental
disorder of schizophrenic alienation.
“In eﬀect, if there were no interweave of interpersonal
relationships, there would be no schizophrenics,” Kimura
peremptorily wrote [5].
Indeed, constitution of the I and constitution of the
Other are like two sides of the same coin: their crisis is the
epiphany (manifestation) of autism.
The constitution of the Other is truly the fundamental
condition of possibility for the world to be intersubjective,
the foundational event of any encounter and the building of
any interpersonal community and social network.
Otherness ﬁnally, is not something added secondarily to
ipse-ness, but is part of the constitutive function of it.
“The Other is not reduced, as is too facilely considered
acquired knowledge, to the otherness of a Somebody Else”
[6].
The Other of Husserl’s pairing (Paarung)o ft w os u b j e c t -
bodies, two Lieb; the Other constituted in us by empathy,
which deﬁnes, delimits, actualizes, cobuilds our ipse-ness;
the Other encountered from our earliest relationships as we
go forward in the world, up to the Other as the creator and
witness with us of the roles of the social network and the
culture of shared meanings.
The Other is the “secret sharer” of Conrad’s novel, who is
a part of us and with us is embarked on our ship of ipse-ness.
On the contrary, an identity marked by a shaky constitu-
tion of the Other corresponds to a shadowy, volatile identity,
which imprints the trait of autism on all the syndromes
of the spectrum of schizophrenia, from the schizotypal to
the schizophrenic, precisely in that, from the perspective of
genetic psychopathology, the fragility of the of transcending
into the other and of constituting it as a subject is projected
onto the diﬃculty of individuation of the Self. The whole
context of life and identity in intersubjectivity thus risks
diﬃculty in emerging and aﬃrming itself.
With regard to the problem of “transcendental constitu-
tion”ofintersubjectivity,Iwonderifweliveinintersubjectiv-




of another, to “feel” how others are, to live the obviousness
of their being subjects like us, like us the source of thoughts,
aﬀections, needs, and desires.
I might add that psychiatry essentially deals with those
modes of existence, tragically compelled and tragically not
free, that do not manage or ﬁnd it hard to constitute
themselves in coexistence, in the world that they nonetheless
design: all the way to that extreme manner of being, marked
by isolation and evanescent communication, which we call
autism.
Solitude and the evaporation of communication: these
are the two most common behavioral aspects of the eclipse
of intersubjectivity. In the history of philosophical thought,
solitude moves between wisdom and madness, between
the search for a higher form of communication and the
impossibility of communication. This dilemma between
“desire” and “impossibility” is true also for the contradictory
facets that the phenomenon of autism oﬀers to the eye.
In any case, we must ask ourselves if the possibility of
suspending “being-with,” (Mit-Dasein), “co-esse,” to at least
a certain point, may not be a possibility, even a saving one,
that still belongs to life.
As seems to happen with certain schizotypes who
precipitate into the loss of the obviousness of the shared
world appear actively to consent to this [7], transforming it
into a value.
The concept then of “communication,” which recurs so
often in the psychiatric jargon about autism, is certainly
not easily deﬁned, and from a certain standpoint all the
phenomenology of interpersonal relations can be viewed in
terms of communication.
In “an ontologically broad sense” communication, “in
which the articulation of being together is constituted,” it
is not just “the transfer of lived experiences from the inner
core of one subject to the inner core of another,” Heidegger
notes this in Sein und Zeit [8]. The loss of communication in
psychosis is much more than the crisis of the transmission
reception of a message. This loss can signal the crisis of
intersubjectivityintheworldoflife,giventhattheobservable
alterations in interpersonal encounter, as I have already
oﬀered, cannot be derived from a secondary manifestation,
an incidental and variable symptom, but belong, plausibly,
to the core of schizophrenic alienation.
Gadamer [9] writes “Language does not belong to the
sphere of I but of We.” A preliminary way of being that does
not descend from nor belong to the free disposability of the
individual: I could say, in heideggerian terms, that language
is an expression of the sphere in which human presence ﬁnds
itself “thrown” (Geworfenheit).
The communication crisis permeates, to be sure, the so-
called “negative” area of psychosis, but it can well be the
precondition of possibility, an initial and perhaps basal point
ofschizophrenicpsychosis,asortof“anticipatorydeﬁciency”
inJanzarik’ssense[10],aregioninwhich“thewordhasgiven
up being recognized”: and for J. Lacan this was the essence of
madness.
However, the solitude of autism that connotes schizo-
phrenia is not univocally made up either of introversion of
absorption into one’s own fantasies, or of social retreat, or of
closing oﬀ communication. All these modes, I repeat, can be
manifestations of the style of life that is called schizophrenic
autism, if its enactment presupposes a “void,” which phe-
nomenological research has explored and indicated using ex-
pressions that refer to the loss of the foundation of existence
in the obviousness of the presence of the Other.
We know what stimulating contributions to the inves-
tigation of the construction of the Self in intersubjectivity
are coming to us today from neurophysiological research,
in extraordinary harmony with Husserlian phenomenology
that aﬃrmed the primacy of intersubjectivity, of “entropa-
thy”. Indeed, current neurophysiological research proposes a
circuit that seems to reproduce Husserl’s phenomenological
construct of Paarung, the pairing of two bodies in action,
of two Leib. “Mirror neurons substantiate a multimodal
representation of relations between organism and organism”
[11].
An early, famous apologue by Jaspers compared phe-
nomenological research and somatological research in psy-
chiatry to the adventure of two explorations that reach
diﬀerent shores of the same continent, which is so vast that
the two researches never meet. Perhaps at this point, it is
worth remembering the virtuous relation between the two
spheres of research; as a title by J. Z. Sadler [12]s a y s“ E i d e t i c
and Empirical Research: a Hermeneutic Complementarity.”
Neuroscientiﬁc research on mirror neurons and phe-
nomenological investigation of the constitution of the other
demonstrate precisely this type of “virtuous complemen-
tarity” that stimulates us to reassess Jasper’s apologist and
attenuates the risk that psychiatrists run of being the
mountebanks of psychiatry, as Naudin and others hinted
[13].
Thus, we have before us neuroscientiﬁc data that are in
strong relation with phenomenological insights and appear
to be the possible elementary, constitutive bases for the
complex ﬁeld of social relations and also of social identity
anditsconﬂuencewiththeotheraspectsofpersonalidentity.
Itseemscertaintomethatinschizophrenia,insuﬃciency
in the “intrasubjective” constitution of oneself corresponds
to a problem in the “intersubjective” constitution of oneself.
In the phenomenological study of consciousness, the un-
discussed reality of the world of life derives from this basic
certainty, or “presumption,” (Vertrauen) that joins together
the naturalness of the Self, the Other, and the World.
The point of departure is the possibility of “intentional
consciousness” which from the beginning, as appears in
phenomenological epoch´ e, constitutes the Other as diﬀerent
from one among many objects, inasmuch as it is a subject
that, like me, thinks and recognizes me. The constitution
of the Other is truly the basic condition for the possibility
of the world being intersubjective, the foundational event
of any encounter. Otherness is thus not something added
secondarily to subjectivity, but it is part of the constitutive
function of it.
To conclude, autism means a form of presence, a being in
the world, in servitude or annihilation that only apparentlyThe Scientiﬁc World Journal 5
can be overturned into its opposite, omnipotence, but always
expresses—as Cargnello reminds us [3]—the impossibility
of being truly oneself..., because of a lack of the authentic
opening toward the You that is conditio sine qua non for any
possibility for authentic existence.
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